Planning to Fail: The
Need for Comprehensive Joint Security Cooperation Planning Doctrine
Annually, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) and Geographic
Combatant Commanders face numerous challenges on theater logistics and security
cooperation. It is clear that there is a need for centralization especially
during deployment, retrograde, and redeployment. In most cases, these processes
occur simultaneously, thus taking a financial toll on the US Government[1].
As war rages on in different Middle Eastern countries, the United States has to
play its role as a world leader. It implies that a significant amount of
resources must be allocated to different military units to see through the
on-going wars. However, the leaders must update the existing Theater Security
Cooperation (TSC) doctrines to ensure efficiency and proper utilization of the
available resources. In fact, there should be a comprehensive and consolidated
joint doctrine for TSC planning.
Background
In the year 2005 alone, the US military spending
surpassed 1 trillion. TSC activities, on the other hand, demand an allocation
of more than $165 billion annually. While this is relatively a dismal amount
compared to the overall military spending, there is no doubt that their
misappropriation adds a burden to the taxpayer[2].
Even worse, the amount has been rising year-on-year as the battle on
radicalized groups and insurgent Russia and China intensify.
In the current national security strategy, the
leadership does not refer to the peacetime military engagement and inter-agency
cooperation. However, the law requires different military units to work with
others to eliminate national and regional conflicts. One of the basic
objectives of American security cooperation is to assist friends and allies to
balance military power for deterrence of coercion and aggression. However, the Department
of Defense’s (DoD’s) strategic direction cannot be aligned with those of allies
unless there is functional TSC planning doctrine. It should be built around the
available scarce resources to address the shift to a capabilities-based defense
approach. An updated TSC planning doctrine strengthens alliances and promotes
democracies as the agencies are professionalized. In this way, the US will improve the allies’ chances of
defeating crises in their countries and the region, be it narcotrafficking,
terrorism, natural disasters, or humanitarian crises.
Description
Today, the US military celebrates
TSC as one of the most important tools of engagement in defense of national or
friendly interests or during deterrence of unwanted activities. To maintain its
effectiveness, theater security cooperation,
and theater plan has to be derived from
the national policy and be linked consistently to the multinational strategic
guidance[3].
In addition, it should be formulated to meet the regional requirements. The
attainment of combatant commander’s strategic security goals is attainable
through sustainment, force development input, organizational structure, and
readiness in training.
Further, a properly planned TSC supports the national
goals in the region by enhancing military operations or eliminating the need
for a military action, hence saving on resources. If there is cooperation among
different US agencies, it will be easier to prepare the environment for
American military intervention, where necessary[4].
TSC plays an ideal role in realizing the national strategy globally. Indeed, it
is a cost-effective tool if well planned.
Analysis and Discussion
Despite the recorded instances of success as a
strategy and in execution, TSC still faces multiple challenges from all fronts.
It stands the test of domestic and international strategic environment with
regards to its ability to implement a cooperative strategy framework for the
long-run. Currently, the DoD struggles with an outdated legislation, the
conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and domestic entitlement programs. Problems like
these are symptoms of a dysfunctional TSC due to misappropriation of resources
and a lacking accountability.
In addition, the resource challenge to TSC derives from operational tempo, fiscal
constraints, outdated authorities, and global force posturing. From a fiscal
standpoint, a timely planning and strategy will address the challenge of
insecurity. Notably, the DoD outlays are historically low and cannot keep up
with the pace of GDP growth. As the Government’s incurrence on Medicare, Social
Security, and Medicaid soar, it is sensible for TSC to carefully plan for its
expenditures to avoid resource misappropriation. Failure to do so will possibly
result in a political pressure that will further slash the TSC’s discretionary
spending to forestall extensive budget deficits. Irrespective of the
constrained fiscal environment, it is mandatory for DoD to meet the demands of
global engagement.
The existing plans do not dedicate resources to the
security cooperation strategy. Instead, they are redirected towards conflicting
policies and legislations. The lack of a joint plan implies that various
authorities regulate up to 30 sources of
DoD funding. Security assistance programs such as financial management service,
foreign military funding, and international military training cannot influence
the way the DoD spends the finances, given that they are State Department
funded. Besides, the U.S. Government accuses other sources such as cooperative
threat reduction (CTR) and Warsaw initiative funding of failing to manage the
program successfully. During the past decade, Service Component’s security
cooperation funding sustained TSC plan execution, but its financial obligations
have since increased. For instance in the year 2008, the US Army did not submit
the 2009-13 program objective in time to avert a resource mismatch. Despite the
move, multiple military agencies still suffer a mismatch because the Army faces
a rising issue in funding the modernization program. The military equipment
reset bill in 2016 is $23 billion and is expected to increase yearly to 2025.
Moreover, the army requires more than $230 billion for the modernization of the
combat system and the associated technology. The fiscal realities such as these
indicate that the DoD had inadequate resources to update the security
cooperation plan. In fact, the service chiefs barely meet their
responsibilities of equipping, organizing, and training their forces. To
eliminate these challenges, there is a need
for reforms and consolidation of funding streams to provide TSC a greater
influence in the allocation of finances for adequate security cooperation.
The military leadership is also likely to face a
challenge in sourcing for adequate resources in the form of trained military
professionals to execute security cooperation programs. Specifically, JSCP
(Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan) does not recommend the allocation of forces
security cooperation unless they come from a command combatant’s area of
responsibility or are willing to work temporarily[5].
The United States struggles to meet the rising demands of specialized troops in
Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. Without an adequate funding and better
utilization of TSC resources, the US Government will fail in the preparation
for steady deterrence as proposed in the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) strategy.
It is important for TSC to properly evaluate the
program’s effectiveness because in the domestic strategic environment, there
are competing and scarce defense resources. Therefore, it is adequately
necessary to prioritize funding, defend resources, and apply them where they
are needed the most. To date, the submitted annual plans inform and serve the
joint staff on the security cooperation’s actions but do not exhibit the level
of effectiveness, responsibility, and accountability[6].
Even worse, the DoD has never published an assessment guidance regarding the
TSC’s activities.
TSC is subjective in nature, thus is difficult to
measure and assess. Mostly, its evaluation consists of reporting of the
captured output, for instance, the amount
of resources used to train the students, expenditures on exercises, and port
calls. Despite being fundamental in measuring the program’s success, they
provide scanty information on the overall health of the TSC because the
variables cannot account for embezzled funds. In light of this, the new plan
should introduce assessment templates that require the performance measures,
the execution process, and the alignment of programs with priorities. In fact,
the strategists should measure TSC’s effectiveness against the greater
cooperation efforts.
The Need for
Intelligence Support
Strategic intelligence plays an important role in
national security because it assists the policy and decision makers. Essentially,
a strategic intelligence contains information necessary for the development of a logical TSC plan. The DoD can utilize the infrastructure
both domestically and abroad. The role of the intelligence community is to
provide optimal avenues of information analysis, gathering, and dissemination.
In the United States, there are more than 15 specialized agencies classified
under two main bodies. In all of them, there are five elements that include
planning, direction collection, processing, and analysis. Each component
functions differently from the other, hence complicating the process of
obtaining synchronized information for use in TSC planning. Often, the US
Defense attaché officers waste time trying to piece together bits of
information from different elements to form a resourceful intelligence. With
the advent of technology and evolving battlegrounds, this should change for the
better. Stronger ties and coordination
among the officers from different agencies should ease the acquisition of
intelligence and its subsequent application to uphold TSC integrity.
Counterargument
The America’s DoD is making significant progress
internally to reconstitute the hierarchies ad accommodate the changes that
allow for transparency and accountability in resource allocation. The 2005
Guidance of Security Cooperation identifies TSC as an important entity and
obligates the coordination of its activities to those of SDA (Service and
Defense Agency)[7]. The
development is laudable as a step forward towards a full integration and
synchronization of activities of different agencies within the department.
Nevertheless, the interagency coordination and planning is and will continue to
be a significant issue in the foreseeable future. Particularly, the American
Government lags behind in for comprehensive coordination of security
cooperation strategies and plans. The 2005 SCG (Security Cooperation Guidance
is categorical on the necessity of the coordination of efforts across the DoD
and the Department of State. However, no government process exists currently to
adequately coordinate and organize the efforts of law enforcement agents within
their area of responsibility countrywide. Less than a decade ago, the
Department of Defense established a JIACG (Joint Interagency Coordination
Groups) at each level to provide advisory services on the TSC to improve the
coordination and synchronization of tasks and interagency staff. It was to execute
the task via the identification and integration of NGO’s (Non-Governmental
Organizations), multinationals and other Washington’s agencies’ efforts within
TSC plans. So far, it has achieved remarkable success, but its efficiency is
limited because of handicapped authorities and a shortage of appropriate
professionals.
Furthermore, JIACG’s assigned personnel must play a
bigger role than retaining their honorary role as simple subject matter
advisory experts to ensure TSC’s effectiveness as a tool for coordination and
planning. Additionally, the JIACG staff should assume active resourcing and
authoritative decision-making responsibilities to minimize instances of waste
and inefficiencies. The importance of interagency collaboration calls an
expedition of the process. Most importantly, the government creative processes
and efforts should not successful and effective in inter-agency cooperation.
Conclusion and
Recommendations
Since the 2001 twin blast, the innovative program n
strategic planning guidance has worked hard to boost regional instability
through transforming the militaries of neighboring countries and building of
partner capacity. Despite this observable success in the American military, The
United States has to overcome other multiple challenges. Firstly, the
Department of Defense must receive adequate financial resources to implements
its plans successfully. Second, the authorities must consolidate the funding
and reform the TSC to provide more influence on
its leadership on how the inter-agency cooperation can influence how the
resources are allocated for the collaboration. All the agencies must be
integrated into the regional force management to provide the TSCs with
predictable manning resources to shape their area of responsibilities.
In the long-term,
the leadership of civilian defense ought to address the military strengths needed to accomplish the ground force’s tasks
required out of Quadrennial Defense Review strategy. To improve resourcing
measures, the US Government must conduct a thorough re-examination of the
surviving Cold-War-style legislation characterized by extravagance and
unproductive use of resources in security cooperation plans. In fact, the State
Department should initiate legislations that streamline the authorities in
which the TSC can build the capacity and capability of allied States for full
funding and articulation. The current challenges will only be addressed if the
United States re-examine the FAA (Foreign Assistance Act) and introduce a
broader framework reform on how the global superpower provides security
assistance. The new TSC must have flexible resource authorities as well.
The US government should put the measures in place to
analyze the effectiveness of TSC efforts for prioritization of programs and
effective application of financial resources to meet the projected strategic
outcomes[8].
The necessary assessment constructs should gauge the rate of return on TSC’s
investments. Besides, all the accountability constructs should reconsider the
need for a balanced security cooperation approach. In the short-term, TSC
should pursue partner capacity development programs while in the long-run, it
should stress on exhibiting a will to build trust as it accesses the regional environment.
Lastly, the DoD needs to improve its ability to
disparate and coordinate theater security cooperation initiatives, especially
those executed within its area of responsibility. It must implement improved
processes that leverage global and regional security cooperation partners. The Defense Department must hire a new
generation of specialized personnel that not only strengthen inter-agency
planning at the State level but also
execute authoritative sourcing decisions on security cooperation. Research
indicates that if the US Government integrates the security cooperation, it
will avoid duplications in fiscally constrained and economically challenged
environments.
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[1] Bogdanos, Matthew F. Joint
Interagency Cooperation: The First Step. National Defense Univ Washington
Dc Inst for National Strategic Studies, 2015.
[2] Hogan, Melvin S. Contractors in the Joint Theatre:
The Need for a Joint Doctrine. Naval War Coll Newport RI, 2013.
[3] Baginski, Theresa, Brian
J. Clark, Francis Donovan, Karma Job, John S. Kolasheski, Richard A.
Lacquement, Simon D. Roach, Sean P. Swindell, Curt A. Van De Walle, and Michael
J. McMahon. A Comprehensive
Approach to Improving US Security Force Assistance Efforts. Army War Coll
Strategic Studies Inst Carlisle Barracks Pa, 2011.
[5] Goldfein,
David. L, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.01A, Campaign Planning Procedures and
Responsibilities, 25 November 2014.
[6] Michael J. McNerney, Stuart E. Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David
Stebbins, Renanah Miles, Angela O’Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver; Defense Institution Building in Africa: An
Assessment; RAND Corporation, 2016
[7] Zaccor, Albert, and U. S. Army.
"Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated
Strategy." Occasional
Paper. Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States (2014).
[8] Rhatican, Thomas M. Redefining Security Cooperation:
New Limits on Phase Zero and" Shaping". Army War Coll Carlisle
Barracks Pa, 2012.
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