Marbury vs. Madison

Marbury vs. Madison

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

5 U.S. 137 (1803)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: President John Adams appointed Mr. William Marbury as a justice in the District of Colombia. Since Marbury was an end-of-term appointee, he took a legal action against James Madison while seeking delivery of his commission. Madison was  a Secretary of State.

FACTS: Prior to President Jefferson’s inauguration, his predecessor created new judgeships by filling the judiciary with Federalist appointees. In these efforts, President Adams nominated 42 new judges under the District’s Organic Act (Van Alstyne & Marshall, 2012). A day before a new president took over the mantle, the Senate confirmed President Adams’ appointments. Still, a handful of the commissions including that of Marbury remained undelivered after the transition. The new president instructed his Secretary of State to withhold the delivery of new commissions, prompting Marbury to seek mandamus in the American Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have a Jurisdiction to review Marbury’s Mandamus?

HOLDING: No. The Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.

Rationales

R1: After confirmation, the John Adams signed Marbury’s commission. Since the president made the appointment official, Marbury has a right to the commission.

R2: The Supreme Court cannot issue a mandamus unless it shows it as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. At the time, it lacked the legal authority to exercise the appellate jurisdiction.

R3: The Senate could not expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond the specification of Article 3 in the constitution.

R4: Clearly, the law gave the president a mandate to deliver Marbury’s commission. In this case, the function of the Supreme Court is limited to reviewing executive actions and to direct the government’s officer to execute his function. Besides, the Court must sustain an original action to issue a mandamus to the accused.

Dissent: The courts may direct the mandamus. However, issuance of a writ to a State official for paper delivery is comparable to sustaining an original act for a similar paper.

Comment: Marbury vs. Madison case has a legal and political importance. In fact, it transformed the Supreme Court to an equipotent federal government arm.

Plessy vs. Ferguson

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

163 U.S. 537 (1896)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: According to a Louisiana statute, all railroad companies must provide equal but separate accommodations for both white and black passengers. After refusing his refusal to leave the whites section of the train, Plessy (the plaintiff) was prosecuted. Eventually, he lost the case.

FACTS: Plessy attempted to sit in the whites section of a railroad car. He refused to cooperate with the officials when they told him to sit in the blacks section. The police arrested him due to his criminal liability as outlined in the statute. During the trial, Justice Ferguson found Plessy guilty on the grounds of legal reasonability. The presiding judge argued that the police exercised their powers as per the state tradition, usage, and custom. Then, Plessy filed a petition against Ferguson for the writs of certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The plaintiff asserted that racial segregation not only stigmatized African-Americans but also stamped the black community with a badge of inferiority in violation of Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments.

ISSUE: Can the states enact policies that allow persons of all races to use segregated facilities?

HOLDING: Yes. The states can introduce legislations that segregate people according to their races.

Rationales

R1: There is insufficient evidence to indicate that the Louisiana statute violated the Thirteenth Amendment. It illegalized involuntary servitude and slavery but not as a form of criminal punishment.

R2: The Thirteenth Amendment cannot sufficiently protect former slaves, particularly in the Southern States because there were several sub-clauses that imposed burdens and disabilities to them in their pursuit of liberty and the right to own property.

R3: According to the Fourteenth Amendment, the law prohibits all American citizens (by birth or naturalization) from enacting or enforcing laws that abridge the immunities of others. Plessy violated this legal requirement.

R4: The proper construction of the Fourteenth Amendment involves the issue of exclusive privilege rather than racial segregation (Kousser, 2013). In fact, it focused on the establishment of citizenship to former slaves instead of addressing the post-slavery matters.

Justice Harlan’s Dissident: The judge said that everyone was aware that the statue’s role was to segregate blacks from whites. However, he admitted that the constitution was color-blind and could not tolerate social classes.

Comment: The ruling aroused mixed feelings from the public and activist groups. Decades later, Brown vs. Board of Education overturned Justice Harlan’s decision.

Brown vs. Board of Education

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

347 U.S. 483 (1954)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Traditionally white schools denied various black children admission and acquisition of knowledge. Notably, the law permitted or mandated racial segregation in learning institutions. The African-American children sued the board as a result (Patterson, 2011).

FACTS: Brown vs. Board of Education consolidates different lawsuits in Delaware, Kansas, Virginia, and South Carolina. Legal representatives sought the admission of numerous black children to whites-only public schools on the grounds that the separation was unlawful under Equal Protection Clause. The Court cited Plessy vs. Ferguson case in all but one case. Consequently, the plaintiff appealed in contention of the District Court’s judgment stressing their deprivation of equal legal protection.

 ISSUE: Is racial segregation in learning institutions constitutional?

HOLDING: No. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, racial segregation in schools violates Equal Protection Clause, hence is unconstitutional.

Rationales

R1: Through segregation, the board of education denied the African-American children the equal protection of the law as per the Fourteenth Amendment, irrespective of the similarity of physical facilities.

R2: The Court must determine this case in light of the role of public education in America during the 1950s rather than during the adoption of Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the Plessy vs. Ferguson outcome did not affect public education sector.

 R3: separation of blacks and whites in schools generated the feeling of inferiority complex among the African-Americans that could affect their minds and social lives.

R4: Particularly when racial segregation has a sanction of the law, its impact is greater. For instance, the African-American children could not access some of the benefits available in integrated school systems.

Justice Warren’s Dissent: The judge argued that racial segregation in schools introduces the inferiority feeling with respect to their black community status, hence the negative mental and social effect.

Comment: In this case, the Supreme Court relies on a similar rationale to that of Sweat vs. Painter to invalidate racial segregation. Whether the perception of stigma qualifies to invalidate constitutional stances supported by neutral purpose is subject to inquiry.

Bowers vs. Hardwick

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

478 U.S. 186 (1986)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: The law enforcers criminally charged a male homosexual for committing consensual sex with another adult man in his bedroom.  The judge held that homosexuals lack a constitutional entitlement to engage in consensual sex.

FACTS: Hardwick brought suit in a Federal Court as a respondent to challenge the constitutionality of the statute that criminalized consensual sex among homosexuals. The respondent admitted his practice of homosexuality to avoid an imminent danger of arrest. According to the District Court, the respondent failed to state a claim, hence it granted a motion for case dismissal. Thereafter, The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Court’s ruling, arguing that consensual sodomy was an intimate and private association. The Circuit remanded the trial ruling decision as well.

ISSUE: Do fundamental right to privacy protect consensual sodomy?

HOLDING: No. The American constitution does not protect the act of consensual sodomy under the fundamental right to privacy (Kappelhoff, 2012).

Rationales

R1: There is neither a precedence nor a constitutional right to support the respondent’s consensual homosexuality.

R2: At the time of this landmark ruling, the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court did not set to include consensual sodomy under Constitutional protection.

R3: Understandably, the Court was vulnerable and nearly illegitimate in this case, given that the lawsuit was over-reliant on judge-made decisions rather than the Constitution.

R4: According to the Supreme Court, many American states considered sodomy and homosexuality illegal. Therefore, it was not in the Court’s best interest to initiate controversies by ruling in favor of the respondent.

Dissent: Justice Blackmun argued that intimate relationships at the privacy of home (albeit bisexual or homosexual) are included in the Constitution’s privacy protection. On the other hand, Justice Stevens said that the Court must dismiss the respondent’s complaint because the Constitution dismisses all forms of homosexuality. Judge Burger found no substantial grounds to deprive the State a mandate to introduce amendments to the challenged statute. Lastly, Justice Powell maintained that The Eighth Amendment can protect the respondent regardless of the absent fundamental right to sodomy.

Comment: The Supreme Court fails to link this case with other privacy lawsuits because the common laws of the initial thirteen states forbid sodomy.

Lawrence vs. Texas

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

539 U.S. 558 (2003)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Texas police found two men engaging in sexual conduct in their home. The law enforcement agents arrested and arraigned them in Court for violating a statute that prohibits homosexuality. Sodomy is not a fundamental right but the Fourteenth Amendment protects the intimate sexual relationship between two or more consenting adults.

FACTS: In Harris County, Houston, the dispatch officer sent two policemen to a private residence in response to weapons disturbance reports. Without permission, the officers entered the home of John Geddes and observed Tyron Garner and another man, Lawrence, engaging in sodomy (Tribe, 2014). They arrested both men and charged them with a violation of Texas statute that criminalized homosexuality. The Justice of Pease found the two men guilty.

ISSUE: Does a statute that prohibits homosexuality violate the Due Process Clause liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment?

HOLDING: Yes. A statute that illegalizes homosexuality contravenes the Due Process Clause.

Rationales

R1: The defendants are two adults and conducted their intimacy in a private and consensual manner.

R2: The right to privacy grants an individual (single or married) to be free from unwarranted state intrusion into sensitive matters affecting a person or two consensual people.

R3: The Court describes homosexuality as an exercise in liberty rather than a fundamental right. Therefore, the judge must apply a rational basis scrutiny to uphold the law.

R4: The Planned Parenthood case law is inconsistent with the Court’s willingness to overturn the ruling. Therefore, the Court should opt for consistency and stability rather than manipulate the invoked doctrine.

Dissent: The judge admits that the statute does not declare sodomy as a fundamental right. In addition, the Court does not subject the Texas law to a strict scrutiny it would get if homosexuality was a basic right. According to him, the decision of the Supreme Court to overrule Bowers raises philosophical issues on the reclassification of homosexuality in the Due Process Clause. In contrast, Judge Thomas, argue that the Court should repeal the law to accommodate time changes.

Comment: In this case, the main focus of the Court is to protect relationships rather than homosexuality. It is alarming that the Texas statute aimed at controlling personal relationships instead of granting liberty to people it seeks to protect.

Bumper vs. North Carolina

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

391 U.S. 543 (1968)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: The plaintiff accused a male person of rape. The Court used a .22 caliber rifle found in his grandmother’s home as a piece of evidence. The law states that a warranted search is unjustifiable should it turn out later that the warrant used was not valid (Goldberg, 2012).

FACTS: The petitioner resided with his grandmother (a 65-year-old African-American woman). A few days after an alleged rape, two police officers visited the old black woman and informed her that they had a search warrant. She obliged and the officers found a gun that they used later as a piece of evidence in a Court of law. During the suppression hearing the police conceded that they did not use a search warrant. On the other hand, the widow claimed that she was unaware that her son was a suspect at the time of visit. However, the Court discovered the black widow consented to police inspection.

ISSUE: Is a search justifiable as lawful when a person gives consent only after the law enforcers assert their possession of a warrant?

HOLDING: No. Consent does not exist under these circumstances.

Rationales

R1: The prosecutor bears a burden of proving that the old woman voluntarily and freely gave the consent. The burden is non-dischargeable through a show of no more than acquiescence to declare a lawful authority.

R2:  Conducting a search while relying on a warrant cannot be justified later by consent, especially if it later becomes invalid.

R3: If the State cannot prove the existence of a warrant like in this case, the outcome cannot change as well.

R4: When police declare that he searches the home under a warrant, he implies that the occupant must obey his orders. Therefore, the old woman was powerless as the officers coerced her unlawfully.

Dissent: The erroneous admission of a rifle as evidence against the petitioner was bluntly damaging, hence was not a harmless error. Therefore, the judge ruled that the police search is unjustifiable as lawful because of lack of consent.

Comment: The voluntary consent of petitioner’s grandmother was binding because Mrs. Leath owned both the rifle and the house. However, there were several inhabitants of the house and the police found the gun at a common place.

The United States vs. Matlock

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

415 U.S. 164 (1974)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: the police searched the leased home of a robbery suspect after obtaining a consent from a suspect’s roommate. The Supreme Court ruled that a voluntary consent was absent because the prosecution failed to prove the acquisition of actual consent.

FACTS:  Police arrested Matlock (the respondent) for robbing a government-insured bank. His lawyer filed a motion to nullify the evidence confiscated at his leased home. Notably, the respondent resided in the house with other individuals. When the law enforcement to went to the respondent’s home, Ms. Graff (who also inhabited the house) allowed them to enter. The police were categorical in searching for a gun and they informed Ms. Graff accordingly. Later, the woman denied consenting when the officers found money in the closet. The Court learned that another individual shared the bedroom with the main suspect. Consequently, the District Court ruled in favor of the admissibility of seized items.

ISSUE: Is the consent of a third party sufficient to allow the admissibility of seized items as evidence?

HOLDING: Yes. The Court clarified that all the inhabitants of the house had joint access, ownership, and control. Thus, any of the cohabitants can consent to inspection.

Rationale

 R1: Consent of an individual that share authority over effects or premises is valid against the non-consenting absent suspect that shares the ownership and control (Rotenberg, 2012).

R2: Ms. Graff produced legal documents to indicate that the suspect was his husband, thus strengthening the argument.

R3: The State sustained its burden of proving because Ms. Graff confirmed giving her consent to the police to search the house.

R4: The respondent unknowingly assumed risk when he cohabited with his wife and another male.

Dissent: The judge ruled that the police officers did not violate the fourth amendment that prohibits unreasonable searches because a third-party that possessed a common authority provided consent.

Comment: This case expounds the Supreme Court’s consent to inspection doctrine.

References

Goldberg, F. (2012). Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law. Harv. CR-CLL Rev., 5, 53.

Kappelhoff, M. J. (2012). Bowers v. Hardwick: Is there a Right to Privacy. Am. UL Rev., 37, 487.

Kousser, J. M. (2013). Plessy v. Ferguson. Dictionary of American History,6, 370-371.

Patterson, J. T. (2011). Brown v. Board of Education. Oxford Publishers: London.

Rotenberg, D. L. (2012). Essay on Consent (less) Police Searches, An.Wash. ULQ, 69, 175.

Tribe, L. H. (2014). Lawrence v. Texas: The" Fundamental Right" that Dare not Speak its Name. Harvard Law Review, 117(6), 1893-1955.

Van Alstyne, W. W., & Marshall, J. (2013). A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison. Duke Law Journal, 1-47.