Relationship between Britain and the EU since 1945

Relationship between Britain and the EU since 1945

Britain has had a frosty relationship with EU since 1945. However, the country has made a tremendous contribution to the union. In fact, historic experts regard Britain’s EU membership as symbolically important. Should the UK opt out of EU, chances are that other members will follow suit, hence leading to a collapse.

As a political movement, a movement for European unity initiated after the Second World War. British voices supported and inspired the formation of a political union in 1945. In 1946, Winston Churchill proposed the formation of federal European republic after realising the worst consequences of war in a sharply divided continent. However, in his view, Winston Churchill did not intend for Britain to become a key player in the Union. Instead, he proposed that France and Germany should lead the unification process. Critics often describe the ambivalent status of the UK and its citizens as ‘wishing to play an integral role in Europe from without’. There is a rather strong “othering” of EU as an issue to be tackled by another party and as a continental problem. British citizens and politicians that are pro-EU are defeated and humiliated on several occasions on matters focusing on UK’s increased integration with mainland Europe.  Parties such as Liberal Democrats--despite having a pro-EU stance—have a section of its members leaning towards nationalist views. Studies indicate that an average Briton has a stronger bond to Commonwealth of Nations than EU.

After 1945, during the aftermath of Second World War, there were calls for Britain to lead its neighbouring Western European nations towards economic recovery and prosperity. Churchill led European Conference on Federation as a significant step towards the formation of EU. In 1948, Churchill was one of the participants in the Hague Congress. The meeting was held to discuss the role and future structure of a proposed Europe Council. However, it is important to note that political mainstream players of British government failed to attend the congress despite their strong advocacy. Immediately after the war, the UK was preoccupied with the independence of African states until 1954. It was deemed fit for British global empire to be dissolved. As such, it did not become one of the founding members of European Communities.  The founding six member countries signed the Paris Treaty in April 1951to create European Steel and Coal Community though they failed to agree on the formation of European Defence Community. Churchill pan-Europeanism call for the formation of United States of Europe was futile as he did not lead his country to join European Steel and Coal Community.

During late 1940s, Hugh Gaitskell (Labour Party Leader) declared that if Britain joined European Economic Community, its centuries of history will come to a screeching halt. Later on, Labour party’s stance shifted in support of the European Community membership. Conservative groups in the UK also opposed common market membership. Therefore, conservatives formed Anti-Common Market League chaired by Victor Montagu as an opposing force.  Trade unionists and labour politician’s fear of bloc membership emanated from a possibility of socialist policies infringement.  There was a repetition of such nationalist views in the year 2002 when Denis Healey and other Labour MPs formed LAE (Labour against Euro) group to oppose British membership of Eurozone and the use of a single continental currency. 

1956 Suez Crisis Impact

UK faced multiple strains in its relationship with the United States even prior to unfolding of 1956 Suez Crisis events. Suez conflict aftermath served as a wake-up call for the UK that the US no longer preferred Britain as a special partner.  The country’s unwavering trust in America resulted in a massive economic loss, prompting the UK to reconsider its relationship with the rest of Europe. Resultantly, Denmark, Britain, and Ireland got into talks in preparation for European Free Trade Association (EFTA) formation. In 1962, George Brown and other Labour party politician still had a contrasting opinion that Britain should join and lead the EU.

During early 1960s, conservative British government’s membership attempts were resisted strongly by various states in the continent. In particular, French president Charles de Gaulle launched a sharp criticism against British EU membership. Resultantly, EU placed Britain on a one-year-long waiting list instead of being offered a leadership position. Pro-EU Britons regarded this move as a humiliating defeat in their effort to be part of a progressive union. De Gaulle’s 1963 veto became a devastating blow especially for Harold Macmillan who ended his career for the sake of European Affairs. In the ensuing years, there was a major economic decline in the United Kingdom propelled by disturbing political scandals.  Such a combination dented the image of Europe in the eyes of the British public and vice versa (Mophet, 2013).  The veto was eventually lifted when Georges Pompidou replaced de Gaulle as EU leader, hence resulting in lengthy discussions, deliberations, and negotiations from 1970 under a pro-EU government of Edward Health.  As UK president, Health had to confront disagreements related to Commonwealth of Nations and Common Agricultural Policy.  In 1972, all member countries but Norway signed the accession treaties.

Admission

While there were unified calls for Britain to join European Community, Labour members were divided sharply on the need to be part of continental Europe. Therefore, the party proposed a referendum as a democratic process to determine the urgency of unification. Tony Benn formally made such a proposal in 1972. Enoch Powell (conservative anti-EEC political figure) advocated for labour vote that influenced 1974 elections. After Labour party's return to power the following year, a referendum was held on the need for the UK to remain a member of EEC.  68% of British citizens endorsed its EEC membership.  Since then, no other electorate has been allowed to vote on or alter the EU membership.

UK’s 1975-1997 EU Membership and Relations

Currently, there is an ongoing debate between EU supporters and Euroskeptics; not between UK’s political parties. The Labour party (opposition) and the Conservative Party (currently in government) exhibit varied views regarding EU membership. However, in late 1970s and early 1980s, Eurosceptism was more prevalent among labour party members than the Conservatives. In fact, the majority of Labour MPs were had anti-EU views. In 1975, a special conference was held by labour party leaders to vote on British exit European Community—2 to 1 voted for the motion. Similar views were observed in 1979 and 1983 when the party vowed to oppose any move of incorporating Britain in a European federation.

The leadership of Kinnock Neil in 1983successfully negotiated with the opposition to drop its resistance in favour of British integration into European Monetary and Economic Union. However, Margret Thatcher’s 1984 UK rebate gained much popularity. It enabled Britain to minimise its contributions to EU, given that the country was second poorest EU member. It received insignificant farm subsidies because of poor performance of its agricultural sector.  Overall, British acceptance by as an EU member state grew up to 1990s when it declined sharply in subsequent years. At one time, a show of support from member states sank to the levels of 1980s because of timely connections with 1992 Maastricht Treaty. European integration was defeated by failure to establish EU constitution enforceable in all the member states. In light of this, Euroskeptism gained more impact both in the UK and in other European countries.

James Goldsmith established Referendum Party (a single-issue party) to participate in 1997 elections. One of his policies included a call for a referendum that reassesses the relationship of the United Kingdom with the EU.  He argued that domestic issues influenced British electorates more than the affairs of continental Europe (Leach et al., 2011).  Mostly, Britain is labelled as an “awkward partner” within EU, though many other states are opposed to further EU integration and the dissolution of member countries.

The awkwardness of the UK is based on highly enthusiastic views of its citizens on a long-standing relationship with Europe.  In addition, UK bears a distinct culture and identity as a once powerful global empire and its special relationship with the United States, Australia and other former colonies. Besides, Britain has experienced minimal political upheavals as compared to most of EU member states such as Germany, France, and Spain.

Officials of the British government are often hostile on issues related to extensive integration of Europe, but they support intergovernmental cooperation. Opposition to supranational authority and establishment of a single is almost unanimous in the UK. Furthermore, most British are concerned about the possible infringement of national sovereignty should the existing relations with EU be extended. Many political leaders defend the maintenance of ultimate decision-making body within the UK as a nation state (Dalessio, 2011).

Regarding EU policies, UK has had little influence during negotiations, given its belated membership. For instance, EMU strongly opposes British interests and values. British governments often react to proposals made by other member states instead of setting up agendas for pursuit. It is a testament to UK’s determination to slow down the pace of negotiations and integration process, or to limit their effects to national sovereignty. Britain is yet to forge a partnership effective enough to launch a counter-offensive against Franco-German alliance.          Singe market and defence are some of the areas where Britain is mostly influential in the EU. In other areas, EU colludes with minority states to oppose radical changes knitting Europe as a Union. On EU membership benefits, the UK also lacks consensus among the country’s elites as opposed to other member countries of EU. In the past, this issue stirred the Labour party and still does to Conservatives and UK Independence party (UKIP) today.  No other European country shows low levels of support or has little knowledge of EU as compared to the UK. In fact, UK citizens hardly identify themselves as Europeans. Issues related to sovereignty are also prominent in debates across the United Kingdom as demonstrated by major newspapers that take Euroskeptic stances (Dittmer, 2013).

The UK cannot Adopt Euro

From a political standpoint, the reluctance of UK to fully submerge itself as part of Europe is evident. Denmark, Britain and Sweden are the only three member states of the European Union yet to adopt Euro as a national currency. Hoverer, debate lingers in British political cycles whether the country is losing by not adopting the euro. Still, there are multiple reasons why UK will never adopt the European currency to replace its Pound.

Gordon Brown tabled five economic tests to measure UK’s readiness for adoption of Euro.  It entailed the assessment of business flexibility, convergence, financial services, growth and employment. Initially, the test set up by English treasury failed as a result of interest rates and the housing market in the UK. British economic demands cannot be met or addressed by the Eurozone. If the country joins the European Monetary Union, UK's ability to set its own interest rates and to control monetary policies will be lost. A devastating effect will particularly be observed in the housing market.

Unemployment rates in the United Kingdom are remarkably lower as compared to those of continental Europe. Although UK's economy is nearly in recession, one of the main strategies utilised by its economists is to encourage spending as a means of propping up the economic performance. As a result, more jobs are created, thus leading to injection of finances into the economy via taxation of the working population.  Such an approach will be impossible if UK adopts Euro. In addition, EMU’s strict rules and regulations to be adhered to by new members forces British to drop out its economic strategy before embracing Euro as its currency. European rules stipulate that EMU member should bear a budgetary deficit below 3% of its national income (Lynn, 2012). Britain falls short of this criterion and cannot cut back on its spending without triggering a surge in unemployment and an increase in taxation. In the short-run the adopted Euro can discourage investment because it triggers economic instability.

History shows that countries that already use Euro are crippled with economic challenges. It is easy to question the effectiveness of Euro in ensuring economic growth and prosperity. A classic example is the republic of Ireland that joined EU in 1973 but adopted Euro in the year 2002. Ireland’s economy grew steadily and rapidly in the 1990’s prior to the adoption of Euro. It had low corporate taxes thus attracting a pool of international investments. Immediately after becoming euro zone member, Ireland scrapped its old interest rates and replaced them with new recommendations from the Union, leading to devastating economic effects in the country. The halving of interest rate resulted in a rise of inflation by 4.7%.  Today, Ireland’s rate of inflation stands at negative-1.7%.  Even worse, the country has an unemployment rate of more than 14%.  In light of this, the Britain realises that adoption of Euro is a repetition of Ireland’s economic woes (Baimbridge et al., 2014).

History shows that currency unions are prone to collapse, especially in the times of economic recession and financial crisis. Therefore, a success of EMU is not guaranteed. Indeed, Euro has all the traits to be a recipe for poor economic performance and stagnation in the UK. Structural unemployment can rise tremendously on pursuance of deflationary monitory policy by Central Bank of Europe to all member states. The British public is well aware of EMU instability. Theoretically, there are economic benefits of adopting Euro, but a lack of foreign exchange eliminates an effective mechanism of imbalance adjustment. Such can result in economic shocks for new members such as the United Kingdom. During a period of recession, it is hard for a country to increase exports and devalue its currency to stimulate the economy.

Most British critics believe that EMU cuts Europe off from the rest of the planet as it is bureaucratically motivated. If UK adopts Euro, its domestic monetary autonomy will be transferred permanently to the European Central Bank.  Control of short-term interest rates and exchange rate flexibility will be surrendered to the central body in continental Europe. Adoption of Euro also implies that Britain will engage in substantial fiscal transfer programme to poorer countries within the Union so as to eliminate or minimise structural economic inequalities. After 2008 financial crisis, England is yet to afford large-scale intra-EU transfers. Britain is also fearful of poor coordination between EMU and European fiscal policy makers which lessen the possibility of Euro alleviating economic challenges at a local stage.

In Summary, it is clear that the UK is more inclined towards isolation from the continental Europe than to forge lasting political and economic ties. Notably, Britain is one of the richest states of the European Union. As such its membership to the EU is a liability rather than beneficial (Naido, 2014). Besides, the country risks losing its culture and sovereignty it further strengthen its relationship with continental Europe. Adoption of Euro is hardly possible as its relations with EU weaken.

Bibliography

Baimbridge, M., & Whyman, P. (2014). Britain, the Euro and Beyond. Aldershot, England, Ashgate. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=438514.

Dalessio, T.O., 2011. Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates. European Constitutional Law Review, 7(2), pp.336-343. Print.

Dittmer, L., & Dorn, L. (2013). The United Kingdom as an Outsider to the EU History, Politics and Ideological Determinants. München, GRIN Verlag.

Leach, R., Coxall, B. and Robins, L., 2011. British Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Print.

Lynn, M. (2010). Bust: Greece, the Euro and the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Chichester, Wiley. Print.

Morphet, J., 2013. How Europe shapes British public policy. London: Policy Press. Print.

Naidoo, P., 2014. Should the UK leave the EU or Consider an EEA Relationship? A Question of Supremacy. London: Macmillan publishers. Print